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DO THE SENTENCING PROVISIONS OF THE NEW
YORK DRUG LAWS CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT?-PEOPLE V. BROADIE
People are terrorized by the continued prevalence of narcotic
addiction and the crime and human destruction it breeds.
-Nelson Rockefeller, Governor's
Annual Message to the New York
State Legislature, January 3, 1973
In the United States the distribution of narcotic drugs was first regu-
lated in 1914 with the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act.' Prior to
that enactment, opiates, although readily available, were not viewed as
a menace, and were often used by normally socialized and productive
citizens.' After the passage of the Act, addicts were required to buy
drugs on the black market. Unfortunately, these drugs were often adul-
terated and contaminated.' Over the years, drug penalties were made
more severe by both federal and state laws. Prices increased without any
noticeable decrease in supply,' and ultimately, an increase in drug re-
lated crimes followed each price increase.
Within this milieu,' the criminal laws proved unsuccessful in the con-
1. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (Dec. 17, 1914). Although the act was originally
passed as a measure for taxing and reporting the sale of opiates, it was later used to control
their sale. For a discussion of various legal developments concerning the Harrison Act, see
E. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 48-50 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BRECHER]; Israel
& Denardis, The Irrationality of a Law Enforcement Approach to Opiate Narcotics, 50 J.
URBAN L. 631, 636-43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Israel & Denardis]; King, The Narcotics
Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L. J. 736 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as King].
2. BRECHER 3-20, 33-44; 0. RAY, DRUGS, SOCIETY, AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 187-90 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as RAY].
3. BRECHER 47, 96, 101; Israel & Denardis 645-46, 655-56; RAY 195.
4. Although the supply of heroin remained unchanged from the early 1920's until 1952,
the price rose from $25 to $50 an ounce in the 1920's to $3000 an ounce in 1952. BRECHER
58; COMMISSION TO STUDY AND REVIEW THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY CON-
TROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ACT AND TO STUDY THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE STATE'S
DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS, FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 168 (Oct. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as N.J. DRUG STUDY COMM.], cited in Brief for the Defendants McNair
and Mosley, at 23, People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471
(1975).
5. For an excellent and well-documented history and sociology of narcotic use, see
BRECHER 1-192, 528-32. See also Brief for the Defendants McNair and Mosley, supra note
4, at 18-50, 103-13; J. DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS AND MORAL
JUDGMENT (1970); FORD FOUNDATION DRUG ABUSE SURVEY PROJECT, DEALING WITH DRUG
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trol of drug use! Detoxification programs also failed.' Because of the
physiological and psychological phenomena symptomatic of narcotics
addiction,8 only a small minority of narcotics addicts have been success-
fully detoxified. Most have either returned to the use of narcotics or
fallen victim to other serious problems such as alcoholism, barbiturate
addiction, or insanity.'
The experience of the State of New York in this matter, while admit-
tedly quantitatively unique,"° has demonstrated the futility of address-
ing the narcotics problem through the criminal justice system. Never-
theless, in his 1973 annual message to the New York State Legislature,
Governor Nelson Rockefeller placed great emphasis on the need for
toughening the state drug laws." He discussed the "reign of fear" cre-
ated by drug abuse and indicated that people have "lost patience with
the courts" in dealing with the problem. He spoke of how all attempts
at education and treatment had failed, 2 of how police efforts to enforce
the law were frustrated by suspended sentences and plea bargaining,
and of the need for a more effective deterrent to drug use. 3 With consid-
erable speed, the legislature enacted a series of drug statutes which
became effective on September 1, 1973.11 New York sentencing provi-
ABUSE (1972); RAY 180-210; E. ZINBERG & J. ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND THE PUBLIC (1972);
Israel & Denardis, supra note 1; King, supra note 1; Lindsmith, The Narcotic Lobby and
the Drug Problem, 8 VAL. L. REV. 591, 592-603 (1974). But see D. LOURIA, THE DRUG SCENE
(1968).
6. BRECHER 64-100; Israel & Denardis 664-75; King, supra note 1; RAY 190-93.
7. BRECHER 64-89.
8. See RAY 197-208; Israel & Denardis 648-52. Although the withdrawal symptoms last
for a relatively short period of time, the neurophysiological changes created by the drug
and thus the severe craving for narcotics lasts for many years. BRECHER 66-78.
9. BRECHER 85-89. Therapeutic communities are successful only so long as the addict
remains within the community. Most addicts who loave such communities return to their
drug addiction. Id. at 78-85.
10. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 116, 332 N.E.2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 480
(1975). Citing BRECHER 72, the court noted that half of the nation's addict population is
located in New York City.
11. Annual Message of the Governor, Jan. 3, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Annual Message
of the Governor], in N.Y. SESS. LAWS at 2309, 2317-19 (McKinney 1973).
12. It is unclear whether this was actually the case. There exists statistical evidence
indicating that in New York there was a decline in heroin use, heroin related deaths, and
heroin related crimes prior to the enactment of the new laws. These statistics were re-
ported by the N.J. DRUG STUDY COMM. 162, cited in Brief for the Defendants McNair and
Mosley, supra note 4, at 23. The statistics were possibly a result of the success of the Dole-
Nyswander methadone maintenance program used in New York. See note 91, infra.
13. Annual Message of the Governor, supra note 11, at 2317-19.
14. N.Y. SESS. LAWS chs. 276, 277, 278, 1051 (McKinney 1973). For a comprehensive
discussion of the changes created by these statutes see Signorelli, A Judicial Analysis and
Critique of the New Drug and Sentencing Laws, 46 N.Y. ST. B. J. 9 (1974). For an
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sions for the possession or sale of controlled substances are the most
severe in the nation. These laws, which apply to most categories of drug
offenses,' 5 include indeterminate sentences with mandatory minimums
and a mandatory maximum of life imprisonment;"6 limited opportuni-
ties for a suspended sentence;'7 parole only after serving the minimum
sentence;'" severe limitations on plea bargaining;"9 and the disallowance
excellent discussion and criticism of the New York drug laws and applicable cases, see
Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New York's 1973 Drug
Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 638 (1975).
Both the New York Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.) and June 25, 1974, at 1,
col. 2; and the New York Post, Sept. 4, 1974, at 3, col. 1, reported that there was no
noticeable decrease in drug traffic in the first year after the effective date of the new laws.
Rather, the result has been to make the drug traffic more circumspect and to increase the
cost of the drugs. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1974, at 60, col. 1, 3; N.Y. Post, Sept. 4, 1974, at
64, col. 4. The only real success of the law has been the creation of important informants.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 72, col. 4 (city ed.); N.Y. Post, Sept. 4, 1974, at 64, col. 1.
This gain, however, has been offset by the subsequent reticence of some prosecutors to
prosecute to the full extent of the law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 72, col. 4 (city ed.);
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1974, at 60, col. 1.
15. Class A felonies are now subclassified as A-I, A-II, and A-II felonies. N. Y. PENAL
LAW ANN. § 55.05 (McKinney 1975). The controlled substances offenses include seven
degrees of criminal possession and six degrees of criminal sale. Id. §§ 220.00 et seq.
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75). First, second, and third degree criminal possession or sale are
classified as A-I, A-II, and A-III felonies, respectively. These offenses involve small
amounts of controlled substances. Sale or possession with intent to sell any amount of a
narcotic drug is at least an A-III felony. Id. §§ 220.16, 220.39. For narcotic drugs, an
aggregate weight standard is used; the degree of the offense is determined not by the
actual amount of the drug, but rather by the total weight of the substance or mixture
containing the drug. Id. §§ 220.00 et seq. If a drug offense is classified as an A-I, A-I, or
A-I1 felony, the attempt to commit such an offense falls within the same felony classifica-
tion as the actual commission of the offense. Id. § 110.05 (McKinney 1975).
1975 amendments to the penal law exclude methadone from the definition of "narcotic
drug." N.Y. SEsS. LAWS ch. 785, § 1 (McKinney 1975). These amendments reduced the
penalties for methadone offenses, id. chs. 785, 786, and allowed for the resentencing of
those convicted for methadone offenses under the 1973 laws. Id. ch. 783.
Under the pre-1973 statutes, criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree
was a class C felony. REVISED PENAL LAW OF 1965, N. Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 1030, § 220.20
(McKinney 1965), (repealed 1973), and the criminal sale of a dangerous drug in the first
degree was a class B felony. Id. § 220.40.
16. N. Y. PENAL LAW. ANN. §§ 70.00(2)(a), 70.00(3)(a) (McKinney 1975).
17. A suspended sentence or probation is not allowed, id. § 60.05(1), unless the defen-
dant is providing material assistance in the investigation of drug offenses. Id. §
65.00(1)(b). Even then, the probationary sentence is for life. Id. § 65.00(3)(a)(ii).
18. N. Y. CORRECrION LAW ANN. § 212(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75). This release on
parole is accompanied by lifetime supervision. Id. § 212(8).
19. If a person is indicted for a class A drug felony, he may not plead guilty to less than
a class A felony. N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW ANN. § 220.10(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
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of civil commitment" and youthful offender treatment2 in many cases."
In recent months, the New York courts have examined the constitu-
tionality of these laws.23 In the trial level decision of People v. Mosley,"
Judge Celli ruled that these laws were a violation of the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clauses of article I, section 5 of the Constitution of the
State of New York, 5 and of the eighth amendment to the United States
Constitution.26 This decision was quickly offset by People v. Gardner,"
in which Justice Quinn ruled that the sentencing provisions of the drug
laws were not cruel and unusual punishment and thus were constitu-
tional.2" Three appellate division decisions, People v. Broadie,19 People
20. A narcotic addict charged with a class A felony may not be civilly committed to
the Drug Abuse Control Commission. N. Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ANN. § 81.25(b)(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
21. From 1971 to 1975 there was no youthful offender treatment for persons indicted
for a class A felony. N. Y. SEss. LAWS ch. 981, § 1 (McKinney 1971), (repealed 1975).
Although this provision remained unchanged by the 1973 amendments, its effect was
drastically altered by reclassifying B, C, or D drug felonies as A-I, A-II, or A-III felonies.
1975 amendments to the criminal procedure law allow youthful offender treatment for
those indicted for a class A-Ill felony. N. Y. SESs. LAWS ch. 832, § 1 (McKinney 1975).
22. In any event, the legislation is overreaching. The addict who possesses drugs for his
own use suffers the same life sentence as the person who sells drugs. No differentiation is
made between the addict selling to support his own habit and the importer or large dealer
selling purely for profit. Further, the statute does not distinguish between those selling
drugs to addicts and those selling drugs to non-addicts. Hallucinogens and other non-
addictive drugs are incorrectly classified with the narcotic drugs traditionally associated
with criminal activity. Both BRECHER 353-93 and RAY 212-49 provide a discussion demon-
strating that hallucinogens are not as dangerous as commonly believed. See BRECHER 370-
80 for a discussion of such popular misconceptions. For a well-documented discussion of
the various categories of psychoactive drugs, see generally BRECHER, supra note 1, and RAY,
supra note 2.
23. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra.
24. 78 Misc. 2d 736, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 1004 (Monroe County Ct. 1974), rev'd sub nom.,
People v. McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 151 (4th Dept. 1975), appeal aff'd
sub nom., People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975).
The defendant had pleaded guilty to a third degree criminal sale of a controlled substance,
an A-Ill felony, and thus the defendant was subject to an indeterminate sentence with a
mandatory maximum of life imprisonment. See notes 15-22 and accompanying text supra.
25. "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel
and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained." N.
Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
26. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U. S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27. 78 Misc. 2d 744, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Term, Westchester County Part
111974).
28. Four subsequent trial court decisions reached the same result. People v. Bullock,
80 Misc. 2d 73, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 682 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1974); People v. Wixson, 79
Misc. 2d 557, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 818 (Sup. Ct. Crim. Term, Westchester County Part 11974);
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v. Venable,30 and People v. McNair, ' subsequently upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statutes against eighth amendment challenges.2 Re-
cently, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Broadie,3 affirmed
these appellate division decisions." Before discussing these opinions, it
is necessary to consider the constitutional framework of the eighth
amendment.
The eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States pro-
hibits cruel and unusual punishment. The meaning of "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" is flexible; it is not limited to that definition envi-
sioned by the framers of the Constitution.35 The Court in Weems v.
People v. Hollingsworth, 79 Misc. 2d 468, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 765 (Albany County Ct. 1974);
People v. Spencer, 79 Misc. 2d 72, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (Sup. Ct., Erie County 1974).
29. 45 App. Div. 2d 649, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 906 (2d Dept. 1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332
N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975).
30. 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 398 (3d Dept. 1974), aff'd sub nom., People v.
Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975).
31. 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 151 (4th Dept. 1975), aff'd sub nom., People v.
Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975).
32. In upholding the statutes, two of the appellate division departments held that the
unconstitutionality of a statute must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt." People v.
McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 482, 363 N.Y.S. 2d 157, 158; People v. Broadie, 45 App. Div.
2d 649, 650, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 906, 908 (the appellate court approved the trial court's use of
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test). This test was not mentioned by the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d
471 (1975), nor has the author found any support in the literature for it.
33. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471 (1975). A petition for writ of
habeas corpus was filed on behalf of defendants McNair (No. Civ-75-422) and Mosley (No.
Civ-75-416) with Judge Burke of the United States District Court for the Western District
of New York. Phone conversation with Leslie Bradshaw (attorney for McNair and
Mosley), Oct. 14, 1975. Oral argument is scheduled for Jan. 12, 1976. Phone conversation
with Leslie Bradshaw, Dec. 2, 1975 .
34. Although most of the opinion concerned whether there was a violation of the eighth
amendment, the appellants also challenged the statutes on equal protection grounds. The
court of appeals dismissed this challenge in one sentence by stating:
The constitutional equal protection . . . arguments of appellants are not sepa-
rately discussed because the same reasoning which supports the concededly and
intendedly severe sentences, especially with regard to deterrence, would sustain,
if valid, a reasonable classification between defendants in drug cases and in
other cases.
People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 111, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 475 (1975).
The court made no attempt to support this assertion. Since the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment have separate historical developments, it is of questionable validity to say
that the same analysis applies to both amendments.
35. Historical analysis indicates that the intent of the framers was to prohibit torture
and excessive punishments. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 258-63 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the
19751
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United States,36 referring to the cruel and unusual punishment clause,
stated: "The clause . ..may be therefore progressive, and is not fas-
tened to the absolute, but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice."37 This theme was reiterated in
Trop v. Dulles." Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, stated:
"[T]he words . ..are not precise, and . . .their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its meaning from evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."3 The more re-
cent case of Furman v. Georgia0 lends further support to this position.
Although it is clear that torture and other inherently cruel punish-
ments violate the eighth amendment," a punishment need not be inher-
ently cruel to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has used a num-
ber of tests to determine eighth amendment violations. For example, the
Court in Weems42 applied a proportionality test to determine that a
fifteen year sentence of hard labor followed by lifetime parole supervi-
sion for a false entry in a government expense account was excessive
under the eighth amendment." The Court examined the punishment as
it related to the offense and compared the punishment to punishments
for other crimes in that jurisdiction, and for similar crimes in other
jurisdictions." This same proportionality test was used in Trop 5 to de-
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment should change as society develops. See notes
36-40 and accompanying text infra.
36. 217 U. S. 349 (1910).
37. Id. at 378.
38. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
39. Id. at 100-01. Accord, Goss v. Bomar, 337 F. 2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964).
40. 408 U. S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Three Justices wrote opinions stating that the
eighth amendment has a contemporary meaning. 408 U.S. 238, 241-42 (Douglas, J.); 408
U.S. 238, 269 (Brennan, J.); 408 U.S. 238, 327 (Marshall, J.).
41. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J.), id. at 319
(Marshall, J.); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 111, 124, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341, 371
N.Y.S. 2d 471, 475 (1975).
42. 217 U S. 349 (1910).
43. The Court stated that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to offense." Id. at 367. Accord, Ralph v. Warden, Mary-
land Penitentiary, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972); Dem-
browski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 240 N.E. 2d 815 (1968); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W. 2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Ore. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955).
See also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 423 n.13, 503 P.2d 921, 929 n.13, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217,
225 n.13 (1972). Cf. People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 371 N.Y.S. 2d
471 (1975) (the court uses the proportionality test but reaches a contrary result). This
principle is embodied in the Illinois Bill of Rights. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11.
44. For a discussion of the proportionality test, see Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Lim-
ited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STA. L. REV. 838, 853-
70 (1972).
45. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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termine that expatriation for wartime desertion was unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion explicitly stated that mental
suffering can be as violative of the eighth amendment as physical mis-
treatment.
In the five to four decision in Furman,47 the majority justices agreed
that the death penalty was unconstitutional because it was adminis-
tered in an arbitrary manner." Several different tests were used to reach
this conclusion. 9 Justice Douglas placed emphasis on the racially dis-
criminatory fashion in which the death penalty is applied.5 0 Justice
Stewart considered the death penalty to be "freakishly" imposed.", Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall agreed that a penalty is unconstitutional if
it is unacceptable to human society." One of Justice Marshall's tests
concerns the creation of new punishments; a new punishment may be
cruel and unusual unless it is intended to serve a humane purpose."
Marshall also wrote that a punishment is cruel if it involves excessive
pain and suffering, 4 and Justice Brennan concluded that a punishment
violates the eighth amendment if it is "degrading to the dignity of
human beings."55 Brennan's test, which includes both physical and non-
46. Id. at 101.
47. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court provided a short per curiam opinion. Five Justices
concurred in separate opinions: Douglas, id. at 240; Brennan, id. at 257; Stewart, id. at
306; White, id. at 310; and Marshall, id. at 314. Four dissents were entered: Burger, id.
at 375; Blackmun, id. at 405; Powell, id. at 414; and Rehnquist, id. at 465.
48. 408 U.S. 238, 249-57 (1972) (Douglas, J.), id. at 274-77 (Brennan, J.), id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J.); id. at 312-14 (White, J.); id. at 363-69 (Marshall, J.).
49. For a discussion and criticism of the tests used, see Wheeler, Toward a Theory of
Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment after Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 62 (1972).
50. 408 U.S. at 249-57 (Douglas, J.).
51. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J.).
52. Id. at 277-79 (Brennan, J.); id. at 332 (Marshall, J.).
53. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J.). In view of the fact that the mandatory sentences for drug
violations were previously unknown in New York, the analysis of Justice Marshall pro-
vides additional reason for scrutiny.
54. Id. at 330. But cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The "
state attempted to electrocute the prisoner, but the current failed. The Supreme Court
upheld the right of the state to place the petitioner in the electric chair for a second time.
Justice Reed's plurality opinion stated:
The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty
inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguish life humanely. The fact that an unfore-
seeable accident prevented the prompt consummation of the sentence cannot,
it seems to us, add an element of cruelty to a subsequent execution.
Id. at 464.
55. 408 U.S. 238, 271-74 (1972) (Brennan, J.).
1975]
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physical suffering,5" is thus somewhat broader than the one delineated
by Marshall.
Both Justices agree that a punishment may be excessive when it is
unnecessary." Specifically, if a punishment less severe than the death
penalty might achieve the same penal purpose, then the lesser penalty
must be employed." Justice White adopted this "necessity" test.59 He
reasoned that the death penalty is so seldom used that it contributes to
neither deterrence nor retribution."° The death penalty causes
the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contri-
butions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with
such negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and
cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.'
Ten years prior to Furman, in Robinson v. California,"2 the Supreme
Court determined that a narcotics addict may not be punished for his
status or condition. The Court held that the California statute that
imposed a ninety day sentence for the "crime" of being a narcotics
addict violated the eighth amendment. More recently, however, the
56. See, e~g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation is considered non-physical
suffering).
57. Justice Marshall explained that the "entire thrust of the eighth amendment is...
against 'that which is excessive.'" 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972) (Marshall, J.).
58. Justice Brennan strongly approved this test when he wrote:
Although the determination that a severe punishment is excessive may be
grounded in a judgment that it is disproportionate to the crime, the more signifi-
cant basis is that the punishment serves no penal purpose more effectively than
a less severe punishment. This view of the principle was explicitly recognized
by the Court in Weems v. United States, [217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910)].
Id. at 280 (Brennan, J.).
59. Professor Singer has referred to the "necessity" test as the "least drastic alterna-
tive" test. The "least drastic alternative" serving the necessary penal purposes ought to
be used. Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof
and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determina-
tions, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51, 57-59 (1972).
60. 408 U.S. 238, 311 (1972) (White, J.).
61. Id. at 312. Professor Wheeler is highly critical of the "necessity" test used by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and White. He writes: "In most instances this type of test would
be identical to a proportionality test and, in the remaining instances, would be impractic-
able." Wheeler, supra note 49, at 74. He further indicates that there is little data to
demonstrate the extent of deterrence created by any one punishment. Therefore, he main-
tains that the three Justices based their opinions on inconclusive data. Wheeler further
states that even if the extent of deterrence can be ascertained, it would still be difficult
to determine the amount of deterrence necessary to justify specific punishment. He thus
concludes that the Weems proportionality test is the better method of determining the
constitutionality of punishments. Wheeler, supra note 49, at 77-78.
62. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
PEOPLE v. BROADIE
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
United States v. Moore3 and the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Davis4 ruled that addictive compulsion to use narcotic drugs is not a
defense to the charge of possession of narcotics or narcotics paraphena-
lia. Both courts distinguished Robinson by stating that regardless of the
condition or status of being an addict, the defendant had committed the
substantive criminal act of possession of narcotics or narcotics para-
phenalia. Possession of such items is not merely a status or condition.
The case of People v. Broadie concerned a consolidation of cases in-
volving either the sale of controlled substances or the possession of large
quantitites of narcotics."5 The court acquiesced to the legislative deter-
mination of punishment for drug law violations. Citing the doctrine of
judicial restraint,"6 the court stated:
[Wihile the courts possess the power to strike down punishments as
violative of constitutional limitations, the power must be exercised
with especial restraint. . . .[T]he instant sentences do not rise to the
gross disproportionality violative of constitutional limitations."
63. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973).
64. 33 N.Y. 2d 221, 306 N.E.2d 787, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 663 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
973 (1974).
65. Eight cases were consolidated for appeal. In seven of those cases, defendants ap-
pealed conviction for sale of narcotic drugs; one defendant appealed conviction for posses-
sion of one ounce or more of heroin. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 110, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S.
2d 471, 474. The opinion contains an appendix which discusses the history of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment. Id. at 119-30, 332 N.E. 2d at
347-54, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 483-92.
66. Id. at 110, 332 N.E. 2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 474. For a well articulated analysis
of the principles of judicial restraint, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466-72 (1947). In Resweber the state
attempted to electrocute the prisoner, but the current failed. Upholding the right of the
state to place the petitioner in the electric chair for a second time, Justice Frankfurter
wrote:
This Court must abstain from interference with State action no matter how
strong one's personal feeling of revulsion against a State's insistence on its
pound of flesh [electrocution]. One must be on guard against finding in per-
sonal disapproval a reflection of more or less prevailing condemnation. . . . I
cannot rid myself of the conviction that were I to hold that Louisiana would
transgress the Due Process Clause if the State were allowed, in the precise
circumstances before us, to carry out the death sentence, I would be enforcing
my private view rather than that consensus of society's opinion which, for pur-
poses of due process, is the standard enjoined by the Consitution.
Id. at 471.
67. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 110-11, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 475 (emphasis
added). The Weems test finds an eighth amendment violation whenever the punishment
is disproportionate to the offense. In Broadie, however, the New York Court of Appeals
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The court of appeals noted that in New York no punishment has ever
been found to be unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime."
Nevertheless, the court recognized the validity of the Weems 9 propor-
tionality test.70 The court ruled that it is the maximum punishment that
must be considered. Since a defendant is liable for the maximum term
of punishment, the mere possibility of a lesser punishment or parole is
insufficient to create a finding of constitutionality.7
In looking at the nature of the offense, Chief Judge Breitel determined
that it was reasonable for the legislature to look beyond the danger of
an isolated transaction of a single sale of narcotics to the harm created
by the widespread distribution of the drugs.7 2 The court determined that
chose to narrow the Weems standard by requiring proof of gross disproportionality before
a violation would be found.
68. Id. at 111, 332 N.E. 2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 475.
69. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See notes 42-44 and accompanying
text supra.
70. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 111, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341-42, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471,475. Accord, People
v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 738, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1006-07 (Monroe County Ct. 1974),
subsequently reversed on other grounds, see note 24 supra. The appellate division refused
to recognize the validity of the test. See, e.g., People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 78-
79, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 405 (3d Dept. 1974). The Broadie opinion approved the Weems
precedent of comparing a challenged punishment with punishments for other offenses in
the same jurisdiction and with punishments for similar offenses in other jurisdictions. 37
N.Y. 2d 100, 112, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 342, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 476.
71. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 F.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972). Accord, People
v. Broadie, 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 111, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 341, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 475; People v.
Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 739, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1008 (Monroe County Ct. 1974), subse-
quently reversed on other grounds, see note 24, supra. Contra, People v. Venable, 46 App.
Div. 2d 73, 77, 361 N.Y.S. 2d 398, 404.
72. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 112, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 342, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 476. This type of
reasoning is invalid when applied generally. For example, if the legislature were to look
beyond the danger created by the individual motorist who speeds to the danger created
by all motorists who speed, the legislature ought to severely punish automobile speeding.
Using the same logic, if the combined value of items taken in separate petit larcenies is
greater than the combined value of merchandise stolen in grand larcenies, the legislature
ought to punish petit larceny more severely than grand larceny.
Deterrence has as its principal purpose the prevention of crime. If deterrence fails,
society prefers to endure the lesser crime over the more severe. For this reason, deterrence
is effective only when the punishment is proportional to the harm. For example, arson is
punished more severely than theft because arson is more harmful to society. See Wheeler,
supra note 44, at 852-53; Wheeler, supra note 49, at 72-73. The act of arson is a violent
crime; the sale of narcotics is not. A violent crime is more harmful to society than a non-
violent crime. Therefore, it does not make sense to punish the sale of narcotic drugs more
severely than the act of arson. To punish mala in se crimes with less severity than mala
prohibita offenses reflects an insensitivity to social morality and human life.
The sale of a drug is not, in and of itself, a violent act. People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d
736, 739, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1008 (Monroe County Ct. 1974), subsequently reversed on
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the existence of an illegal drug market leads to violent crime. In addi-
tion, the sale of illegal drugs increases the addict population, and as a
direct result, the incidence of crime against property."3 Judge Breitel
concluded that "[d]rug dealing in its present epidemic proportions is
a grave offense of high rank.""
With regard to the offenders, the court determined that each was
"actually or presumptively 
. . . [a] seller . . . ."I' As such, each was
a crucial link in the drug distribution system." In order to break the link
and deter distribution, the legislature could reasonably require severe
other grounds, see note 24, supra. The court recognized that the actual danger created by
drug use is probably overstated. Id. For literature supporting the position that the dangers
of drug use are exaggerated, see note 5, supra. For further source material, see BRECHER,
supra note 1.
Crime associated with the use of narcotic drugs is a result of the drug distribution
system. An addict may commit crimes to obtain drugs; a seller, on the other hand,
commits crimes to maintain his position and influence in the illegal drug market. BRECHER
11-12, 50-63; RAY 187-94; Israel & Denardis 669-73; King 737-39, 748-49. See also notes 1-
9 and accompanying text supra and note 87 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion
of the appellate court's uncertainty on this point, see notes 74, 85-86 and accompanying
text infra.
Narcotic drugs such as heroin, morphine, meperidine, etc., are used medically for the
purpose of analgesia (i. e., to dull pain). Known side effects include constipation and
addiction. Other medical problems such as undernourishment, contraction of contagious
disease, injection of harmful contaminants, etc., are directly related to the illegal drug
distribution system. For a well-documented discussion supporting these points, see
BRECHER 21-33, 47-100; RAY 193-204. Although it is commonly believed that narcotics
addiction leads to lethargy, numerous studies indicate that the use of narcotic drugs is
unrelated to the mental or physical deterioration of the addict. BRECHER 21-32; RAY 187-
91, 197-201. There is also considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that what is
often reported as death by heroin overdose is in actuality an overdose of heroin in combi-
nation with some other substance, e. g., quinine or alcohol. BRECHER 101-14.
73. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 111-13, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 393, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 477.
74. Id. at 113, 332 N.E. 2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 477. The court of appeals failed to
adequately treat the issue of whether the crimes are caused by the drugs themselves or
by the fact that the drugs are illegal. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra. If it is
the illegality of the drugs that causes crime, see note 72, supra, then the solution lies either
in making the drugs legal or in removing them from the jurisdiction of the criminal law.
75. Id. at 114, 332 N.E. 2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 478. Seven of the defendants were
convicted for selling controlled substances. One defendant was convicted for possessing
one or more ounces of heroin. The court ruled that the legislature could have reasonably
presumed that one who possesses a large quantity of drugs is a seller. Id. at 113, 332 N.E.
2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 478.
76. Id. at 114, 332 N.E. 2d at 343-44, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 478. Although the court recog-
nized that inflexible sentences do not serve the goal of rehabilitation, it stated that this
was not necessary if the goals of isolation and deterrence were served. The court clearly
rejected retribution as a legitimate penological purpose. See also People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.
2d 152, 160, 134 N.E. 2d 197, 202, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 367, 373 (1956).
19751
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
penalties. Further, because of the high recidivist rate of those offenders
released from prison, isolation could be considered a desirable goal.77
In comparing the punishments for drug offenses with other crimes in
the jurisdiction, the court found that these offenses were punished as
severely as other class A felonies"5 and more severely than class B felon-
ies."9 This result was upheld on the basis of a reasonable legislative
determination that drug offenses are inherently harmful because they
lead to other crimes. 0
Drug offenses are punished more severely in New York than in any
other jurisdiction." On this point the court reasoned that since drug use
77. Prior increases in penalties for drug offenses have never accomplished the legislative
purpose of isolation and deterrence. Therefore, it is illogical for the court to conclude that
heavier penalties will succeed. The New York Court of Appeals came close to conceding
this point when it stated: "[Tlhe pragmatic value [of the 1973 drug laws] might well
be questioned, since more than a half-century of increasingly severe sanctions has failed
to stem, if indeed it has not caused, a parallel crescendo of drug abuse." People v. Broadie,
37 N.Y. 2d 100, 118, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 346, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 481. See note 87 and
accompanying text infra. Cf. Annual Message of the Governor, supra note 11, at 2318,
which states: "All the laws we now have on the books won't work to deter the pusher of
drugs."
78. All class A felonies carry a mandatory maximum of life imprisonment. N. Y. PENAL
LAW ANN. § 70.00(2)(a) (McKinney 1975). Class A-I felonies carry a mandatory minimum
of from 15 to 25 years, id. § 70.00(3)(a)(i); Class A-II felonies carry a mandatory minimum
of from 6 to 8 years, id. § 70.00(3)(a)(ii); and Class A-III felonies carry a mandatory
minimum of from I to 8 years. Id. § 70.00(3)(iii). Drug offenses are punished more severely
than non-drug offenses because of the procedural limitations on suspended sentences,
probation, plea bargaining, and civil commitment applicable only to drug offenders. See
notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
Class A-I felonies include first degree arson, N. Y. PENAL LAW ANN. § 150.20 (McKinney
1975), first degree kidnapping, id. § 135.25; murder, id. § 125.25; and attempted first
degree murder, id. § 110.05(1). First degree murder involves the intentional killing of a
police officer or an employee of a correctional facility; or an intentional killing committed
by a convict while incarcerated or after escape from a correctional institution in which he
had been serving a life sentence or an indeterminate term of at least 15 years to life. Id. §
125.27. First degree murder has a mandatory death sentence. Id. § 60.06.
79. Class B felonies carry a discretionary maximum of 25 years, id. § 70.00(2)(b), and
no mandatory minimum, id. §§ 70.00(3)(b). Class B felonies include second degree arson,
id. § 150.15, second degree kidnapping, id. § 135.20, first degree manslaughter, id. §
125.20, first degree rape, id. § 130.35, and first degree robbery, id. § 160.15.
80. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 116, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 480. For a criticism
of this position, see note 72, supra.
81. Id. at 116, 332 N.E. 2d at 371, 345 N.Y.S. 2d at 480. Most other states authorize
maximum penalties of from five to twenty years for narcotic sales. People v. Mosley, 78
Misc. 2d 736, 742, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 1004, 1010 (Monroe County Ct., 1974), subsequently
reversed on other grounds, see note 24, supra. For a table comparing the penalties for drug
offenses in the various states, see Brief for the Defendants McNair and Mosley, supra note
4, Table 1, at app. A28-A29.
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is most extensive in New York,"2 more severe penalties are justified., '3
Chief Judge Breitel concluded by stating that "in the exercise of judicial
restraint and with respect for the separation of powers, the Court does
not necessarily approve or concur in the Legislature's judgment in
adopting these sanctions."84 The legislative determination was upheld.
Although the court disagreed with some of the legislature's findings,
its adherence to the doctrine of judicial restraint required deference to
the legislative action. Strict adherence to the philosophy of restraint is
problematic. For example, the court stated that "[b]ecause of their
illegal occupation . . . drug traffickers do often commit crimes of viol-
ence against law enforcement officers and, because of high stakes, en-
gage in crimes of violence among themselves .... "'I The statement
approaches an admission by the court that it is the illegality of drugs
People v. Mosley had also compared the drug penalty to the penalties recommended
by model legislation. Model legislation condemns life imprisonment, recommends five
year sentences, reserves lengthy terms for those who commit particularly heinous crimes,
and allows for the possibility of discharge from parole. 78 Misc. 2d 736, 743, 358 N.Y.S.
2d 1004, 1011. Accord, In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 924, 519 P.2d 1073, 1081-82, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 657-58 (1974). See MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 9 (2d ed. 1972); MODEL PENAL CODE
§§ 6.06, 305.12 (1962); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 142-43 (official ed. 1967).
82. Citing BRECHER 72, the court noted that over half of the nation's addict population
is located in New York City. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 116, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 345, 371 N.Y.S. 2d
471, 480.
83. Id. Local differences in criminal problems may justify differences in legal treatment.
Nevertheless, punishment may not be extreme. This is the essence of the Weems propor-
tionality test. To use the large addict population of New York to justify the severe penal-
ties for drug sales ignores the Weems requirement.
84. Id. at 117-18, 332 N.E. 2d at 346, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 481. The opinion left an impor-
tant point for future litigation: "This is not to say that in some rare cases on its particular
facts it may not be found that the statutes have been unconstitutionally applied." Id. at
119, 332 N.E. 2d at 347, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 482. Since the Broadie court dealt exclusively
with actual or presumed dealers, the issue of mandatory sentencing of mere users remains
an issue.
85. Id. at 112, 332 N.E. 2d at 342, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 477.
Even the questions whether "the policy of criminalization, which raises the cost
and increases the difficulty of obtaining drugs, does in fact make the drug user
a proselytizer of others in order that he may obtain the funds to acquire his own
drugs", and whether "the compulsion of the addict to obtain drugs and the
moneys to purchase them causes him to commit collateral crime that otherwise
he might not commit", are questions about which reasonable men can and do
differ. . ..
Id. at 118, 332 N.E. 2d at 346, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 482, quoting PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
302 (Additional Views of Dr. Brewster, Judge Breitel, Mrs. Stuart, and Mr. Young) (offi-
cial ed. 1967).
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and not the drugs per se that causes drug-related crime. Nevertheless,
the court ultimately acquiesced to the legislative determination that
drug trafficking in and of itself generates "collateral crime, even violent
crime.""6 Although the court emphasized that it was reasonable for the
legislature to determine that the new laws would serve the penological
purposes of isolation and deterrence, such a conclusion is unreasonable
in that it fails to consider the experience of the past sixty years:
"[Elvery similar effort since the Harrison Act of 1914 has failed."8
The Broadie court gave too much deference to the findings of the
legislature. As a result, it failed to properly apply the standards devel-
oped by the United States Supreme Court in Weems v. United States"
and Furman v. Georgia."9 Proper application of the Weems proportional-
ity test would have resulted in a determination that the sentencing
provisions were disproportionate to the crime." Use of the Furman test
of Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall would have required the con-
clusion that the sentencing provisions were cruel and unusual because
they served no valid legislative purpose.'
86. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 113, 116, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 343, 345, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 477, 480.
See note 74, supra.
87. Id. at 118, 332 N.E. 2d at 346, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 482. See note 77 supra. The court
stated: "[Tihe Legislature could reasonably conclude that drug trafficking was a grave
offense; that the defendants, as sellers, posed a serious threat to society; and that the
sentencing statutes, though severe and inflexible, would serve, at least, to isolate and
deter." Id. at 117, 332 N.E. 2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 480. Even though a severe penalty
will isolate the particular offender from society, if the goal of deterrence is not achieved,
a new drug dealer will quickly replace the former seller. Such a result defeats the practical
purpose of isolation. Because narcotic drugs are addictive, deterrence is almost impossi-
ble. The physiological and psychological craving for narcotics created by addiction is so
strong that an addict will do almost anything to get the drug. Criminal penalties cannot
offset such compulsion. Consequently, the drug market is a seller's market and the finan-
cial returns are high. There are always people willing to take the risk of selling drugs; the
dealer simply increases his prices as his risks (i. e. criminal penalties) increase. BRECHER
64-100, 528-31. See notes 3-9 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the neuro-
physiological phenomenon of addiction, see RAY 197-204.
88. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
89. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
90. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra. Nor should the possible lack of
alternative criminal solutions to the problem of drug addiction be a barrier to such a
result. Solutions may be found outside the criminal justice system. BRECHER 115-82, 528-
31; Isreal & Denardis 675-80; King 748-49; Brief for defendants McNair and Mosley, supra
note 4, at 107-13. For example, in Great Britain, where narcotics can be obtained legally,
there is no significant black market and very little crime associated with drug use. Fur-
ther, combined heroin and methadone maintenance programs permit many addicts to
hold regular employment. BRECHER 120-29; Isreal & Denardis, 678-79. Police efforts are
directed at preventing non-addicts from obtaining narcotics. Since these non-addicts do
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In Law, Language, and Ethics, Professors Bishin and Stone pose the
question, "If Judges are supposed to be wise, doesn't this give them
not have the addict's craving for narcotics, deterrence efforts have been successful. Most
important, the number of addicts has remained small. In 1951, for example, the United
Kingdom achieved a record low of 301 addicts. BRECHER 121-22. Anti-drug maintenance
advocates point to an elevated addict population in the mid-1960's. This numerical in-
crease is misleading; the elevated figures resulted in part from a Canadian and American
addict migration into Great Britain and in part from the use of new statistical reporting
methods which tended, to inflate the real number of addicts. Id. at 123-28. In addition,
Brecher believes that a massive anti-drug campaign had the effect of luring non-addicts
into experimentation with narcotics. Id. at 126.
By the end of the 1960's, the number of addicts began to decrease; at the end of 1970
there were only 1,430 reported addicts. Id. at 127. This figure is rather modest compared
to the estimated 250,000 to 315,000 addicts in the United States. Id. at 80. The figure is
even more remarkable in light of the fact that the population of the United Kingdom is
about one quarter that of the United States. THE 1975 WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS
143, 577 (Newspaper Enterprise Ass'n, Inc. ed. 1974). For a full description of the British
drug experience, see H. JUDSON, HERION ADDICTION IN BRITAIN: WHAT AMERICANS CAN
LEARN FROM THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (1974).
Except for limited efforts, drug maintenance was unknown in the United States prior
to the advent of methadone maintenance programs. During the late 1930's and early
1940's, many Kentucky physicians prescribed narcotics to addicts. As a result, black
market activity was minimal. The crime rate among addicts did not differ appreciably
from that of the general population. BRECHER 9-11, 129-34. For a discussion of the opera-
tion of municipal narcotics clinics between 1912 and 1925, see id. at 115-17; Israel &
Denardis 639-40. In general, methadone maintenance programs have been rather success-
ful. Methadone does not produce the "high" created by heroin and it is easier to adminis-
ter because it can be taken orally. In New York, where the Dole-Nyswander program is
used, the success rate in terms of scholastic achievement, employment, socially acceptable
behavior, and reduction or crime is impressive. BRECHER 140-52. The number of arrests of
all those admitted to methadone maintenance programs decreased by 74%. The number
of arrests for those on methadone maintenance for 13 months or longer decreased by 96%.
N. Y. TEMPORARY COMM. TO EVALUATE THE DRUG LAWS, EMPLOYING THE REHABILITATED
ADDICT (N. Y. Legislative Doc. No. 10, 1973), cited in Brief for Defendants McNair and
Mosley, supra note 4, at 107. Other methadone programs have not been as successful as
Dole-Nyswander. This outcome is primarily attributable to administrative mismanage-
ment. BRECHER 163-75. See also National Comm. on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Drug
Use in America 162, 176-81, 319-23 (Gov't. Print. Off., Wash., D. C., March, 1973), cited
in Brief for Defendants McNair and Mosley, supra note 4, at 108; CANADIAN COMM. OF
INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USES OF DRUGS, TREATMENT REPORT 23-30 (Information
Canada, Ottawa, 1972), cited in Brief for Defendants McNair and Mosley, supra note 4,
at 108. Nevertheless, maintenance centers have long waiting lists. For this reason, there
are illicit sales of methadone to those who cannot get the drug legally. BRECHER 529.
Methadone maintenance does not work for everyone, and not all addicts want methadone
maintenance. Thus, a combined heroin and methadone maintenance program is
preferable. Id. at 528-32. The system of heroin maintenance has worked well in Great
Britain for over fifty years. Since the introduction of methadone, more than half of the
heroin maintenance addicts have switched to methadone. Id. at 176-77.
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some special expertise on the wisdom of legislation?"9 Judges should
reach decisions through a process of reasoned elaboration. 3 With regard
to the examination of legislation, reasoned elaboration requires the
questioning of the wisdom of the legislation. To refuse to examine the
wisdom of the legislation effectively forecloses independent judicial re-
view. Nevertheless, Chief Judge Breitel was content to state that
"[t]he Court thus does not pass on the wisdom of the Legislature's
acts." 4 The court relied upon the doctrine of the separation of powers
to justify judicial restraint. 5 But separation of powers cannot serve this
purpose. Rather separation of powers provides a system of checks and
balances among the three branches of government. This system enables
the judiciary to eliminate or modify unwise law, either by finding a
constitutional infirmity" or by construing it in such a way as to limit
its application. The role of the judiciary in this scheme is crucial
because the judicial branch alone reaches its decisions through the pro-
cess of reasoned elaboration. For example, in Furman,97 Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and White found the death penalty to be unconstitu-
tional as applied because a less severe penalty would achieve the same
purpose. 8 Similarly, the Court has held that statutes are unconstitu-
tional if they do not adequately serve valid legislative purposes.9 In view
92. W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 898 (1972) (emphasis added).
93. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 160-89 (tent. ed. 1958).
94. 37 N.Y. 2d 100, 118, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 348, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 471, 482 (1972) (emphasis
added).
95. Id. at 117, 332 N.E. 2d at 346, 371 N.Y.S. 2d at 481.
96. Professors Hart and Sacks emphasize this point when they write: "The sanction of
nullity is pervasive in the whole theory of American public law, although the point is not
always appreciated. Its most familiar form is the power of the courts to disregard a statute
which they deem to be unconstitutional." HART & SACKS, supra note 93, at 174.
97. 408 U. S. 238 (1972).
98. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
99. In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court found unconstitutional a Georgia
statute which required that abortions be performed only in hospitals accredited by the
Jt. Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and with approval by the hospital abortion
board and two consulting physicians. The alleged purpose of the statute was to protect
the health of the public. The Supreme Court determined that the regulation was unrelated
to this purpose because the licensing of physicians provided adequate protection. The
Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) found unconstitutional a Massachusetts
statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptive devices to unmarried persons (except to
control the spread of disease). It stated that the statute did not serve the legislative
purposes of deterring premarital sex or of regulating the distribution of potentially harm-
ful items. See also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1975), in which the
Alaska Supreme Court found a statute prohibiting the private possession of marijuana to
be unconstitutional as an invasion of the right to privacy. It stated that there was insuffi-
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of such precedents, it would have been within the proper exercise of
judicial wisdom and prerogative for the New York Court of Appeals to
have found the 1973 drug sentencing statutes violative of the eighth
amendment.
The New York drug laws were passed in response to the demand for
more effective -law enforcement in the late 1960's and early 1970's.100
Those laws remain as do the public misconceptions which fostered
them. Until these attitudes change, the legislature will continue to expe-
rience difficulty in addressing the problem of drug abuse. Through a
process of reasoned analysis, the judiciary must find a rational solution
to the drug problem.
Eliot J. Greenwald
cient evidence demonstrating the harmfulness of marijuana to reasonably conclude that
the state purpose of protecting the public health was served. Accord, People v. Fries, 42
Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E. 2d 149 (1969), where the Illinois Supreme Court found a statute
requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute
did not protect the public safety because it was directed at the safety of the cyclist only
(but a statute requiring glasses, goggles, or a transparent shield was constitutional because
it protected the public safety by allowing the cyclist to see where he was going). Id. at
450, 250 N.E. 2d at 151.
100. The New Yorker's "The Talk of the Town" provides interesting commentary on
the issue of the public attitude towards crime:
In the last decade or so, a wave of fear swept over the nation and then subsided.
Politicians, the press, and television took up the issue of crime for a few years
and then dropped it. The spread of crime was a real and enduring affliction, but
the campaign to cope with it turned out to be illusory and evanescent, and
vanished like last year's fad. What it left behind is what we see around us now:
a collection of damaged institutions; a deeper suspicion than ever among citi-
zens that what they hear from public men has nothing at all to do with the
conditions of their daily lives; and a rising rate of crime.
The New Yorker, Jan. 6, 1975, at 23.
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